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CONSIDERING POLITICAL ALTERNATIVES
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PETER L. STRAUSS*
That is absolutely right. I am sufficiently confused by the facts that
are already on the table-two of them in particular. One (the dog that I
thought was barking in that interesting first chart Don Elliott put up, on
which he did not remark), is that the first two periods of judicial review
he showed us had 337 and 294 cases of judicial review each; for the third
period, for the same length of time, the figure is about 800.1 Something is
going on there. The other is just a square conflict that our moderator is
much better positioned than I am to tell us about. He recently published
a fascinating study in the Duke Law Journal that purports to show that
the affirmance rate for administrative agencies in the D.C. Circuit, which
gets about 60% of administrative appeals these days, is only 30%.2 His
figures are from 1987, not 1984 or 1985, but I doubt court performance
has changed so sharply in such a very short period of time. These facts
warrant some further exploration.
Cass Sunstein and Don Elliott each, in his way, was talking about
the results of individual cases and the implications for individual cases of
litigation or litigation outcomes. I might describe this as the micro-per-
spective on judicial review and its impact. I will be speaking at a differ-
ent level of abstraction-without facts, of course-but at a level that
seems an important one. My remarks are generally addressed to the
macro-perspective, to examining the overall, systemic impact of judicial
review of a certain intensity on the way agencies go about their business.
This is rather like the Mashaw-Harfst study to which you have already
heard Cass Sunstein refer, a good portion of which appeared over a year
ago in the Yale Journal on Regulation, 3 and that will eventually appear
as a book from Harvard University Press. It is a wonderful study.
Rather like Shep Melnick's study4 and some others, it tells a cautionary
* Betts Professor of Law, Columbia University School of Law.
1. See Shuck & Elliott, To The Chevron Station: An Empirical Study of FederalAdministra.
tive Lav, 1990 DUKE L.J. (forthcoming).
2. Pierce, Two Problems in Administrative Law: Political Polarity on the District of Columbia
Circuit and Judicial Deterrence of Agency Rulemaking, 1988 DUKE L.J. 300, 305.
3. Mashaw & Harfst, Regulation and Legal Culture: The Case of Motor Vehicle Safety, 4
YALE J. ON REG. 257 (1987).
4. R. MELNICK, REGULATION AND THE COURTS: THE CASE OF THE CLEAN AIR ACT
(1983).
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tale about the systemic impact of judicial review on the costs of agency
behavior.
What I want to do at the outset is ask you to imagine the situation
facing George Bush as he assumes the Presidency. And it would have
been the same for Michael Dukakis. However much regulation the Pres-
ident means to accomplish over the next four or eight years, the one
thing he knows is that, for his administration, he has to accomplish that
much regulation for fewer dollars. This is another side, if you like, a
narrower side of the efficiency constraint that Cass was talking about,
that government has got to get into a leaner posture. If, as Jerry Mashaw
and others seem to be telling us, one impact of intensive judicial review is
that it leads agencies to spend more money on a particular regulatory
enterprise and, consequently, to have fewer enterprises that they can take
on as a whole, that might be regarded as a negative impact by anyone
who thought that regulation was an appropriate part of the picture. If,
unlike Cass but like some of his Chicago colleagues, you thought'that the
only good regulator was a dead regulator, this particular inpact would
not especially trouble you; but if you had a regulatory program, it would
trouble you. This seems to me to put a comparative cast on the question
before us. Close judicial scrutiny as compared to what? What things can
the courts do as compared to those things that perhaps Congress or the
President can do?
And now with that very general effort to relate what I am about to
say to what the two previous speakers have said, I will dive into my
prepared remarks, lose eye contact with you and all the rest of that.
At one level, I thought I knew what this question was about when
Dick sent it to me, and how it presented itself to you. The issue to be
discussed today was whether we were for or against the Supreme Court's
decision in Motor Vehicles Manufacturers Association v. State Farm Mu-
tual Automobile Insurance Co., in which the Court essentially endorsed
"hard look" review.5 Those who are for it believe William Pedersen's
testimony some years ago, as a high level official of the EPA, that the
judicial process is the only process past the staff level in an administrative
agency that is likely to produce any significant level of factual probing,
and that the inquiry into "the minute details of methodology, data suffi-
ciency and test procedure" gives those inside the agency, "who care
about well-documented and well-reasoned decisionmaking a lever with
which to move those [inside the agency] who do not."' 6 They believe on
the whole that is a good thing. Richard Stewart is on record expressing
5. 463 U.S. 29 (1983).
6. Pedersen, Formal Records and Informal Rulemaking, 85 YALE L.J. 38, 60 (1975).
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similar views. 7
Those who are against hard look review believe with Steven Breyer8
that it calls on judges to perform a function for which they are not well-
suited; or with Martin Shapiro, that review's inevitable tendency to focus
on only a limited number of issues in a complex proceeding invites a
distortion of agency effort and a quite imperfect view of agency process; 9
or with Shep Melnick, that the programmatic impact on the agency of
hard look review is at best mixed and probably productive of misallo-
cated resources-too much time spent on too few rules, excessive effort
in a few instances producing under-regulation (that is, the absence of
funds to make any effort) in others. 10 Whatever OSHA may have accom-
plished by the rules that it has adopted, all of us know the stories of the
many rules that it has not adopted."' This was certainly a sentiment I
often heard expressed by the rulemakers of the Nuclear Regulatory Com-
mission when I was there. Hard look review meant more work for them
but no significant change in regulatory outcomes in particular cases-just
fewer rules with the resources that were available to them to make rules.
Again, you can approve of that as an outcome, but it is not necessarily
what Congress would have chosen.
The challenge we have been given, however, is not nearly so limited
as that. As Cass addressed it, it is whether close judicial scrutiny of
agency action produces net benefit or net detriment generally. So stated,
the question is not limited to rulemaking and is not limited to close scru-
tiny of factual or judgmental elements of the agency's action, as the hard
look notion is; nor is it limited, as I think that narrower topic also is, to
imagining that the net beneficiaries or sufferers as a result of close judi-
cial scrutiny are us-that is to say, the general public whose good is sup-
7. See Stewart, The Development of Administrative and Quasi-Constitutional Law in Judicial
Review of Environmental Decisionmaking: Lessons from the Clean Air Act, 62 IOwA L. REV. 713,
763 (1977).
8. See Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN. L. REv. 363, 388-94
(1986).
9. M. SHAPIRO, WHO GUARDS THE GUARDIANS? JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATION
151-56 (1988); see also Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519 (1978).
10. See R. MELNICK, supra note 4, at 361-73.
11. OSHA recently imposed new limits on 376 different substances found in the workplace, a
result of proceedings that, given the broad sweep of the regulations, were cursory in comparison with
earlier efforts. Occupational Health and Safety Standards on Air Contaminants, 54 Fed. Reg. 2332
(1989) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1000). The rules relied extensively on improved consensus
standards generated by private standard-setters, particularly the American Conference of Govern-
mental Industrial Hygienists, in the seventeen years since adoption of the original standards. During
those 17 years, OSHA adopted regulations controlling only 24 substances. See Molotsky, New Lim-
its Imposed on 376 Substances Found in Workplace, N.Y. Times, Jan. 14, 1989, at 1, col. 1, 6, cols. 5-
6; cf Michaelson, Atmospheric Pressure: Work-Safety Agency Tries a Squeeze Play, Legal Times,
Oct. 24, 1988. at 33, col. 1.
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posed to be the end generally of the legal order. We could be talking
about close scrutiny of adjudication results, of administrative assess-
ments of questions of constitutionality or law, and we could be asking the
question from the perspective of a regulatory subject seeking review, not
from the perspective of the broadly interested public.
In that respect, Don Elliott's closing comments are quite right. I
well remember a conversation I had with a former Supreme Court law
clerk, then in private practice, when I was an attorney in the Solicitor
General's office. He had filed a jurisdictional statement in a case to
which it had fallen on me to write the response. The case was devoid of
merit; there was not one chance in 50,000 that the Court would be inter-
ested in it. Fate threw us together at a party, and I asked him why he
had imposed on the Court's time this way. "Well," he said "the license is
worth $90,000 a day for the client." For the client, that was sufficient
justification to seek any kind of look.
That it seems so natural to state and understand the question put to
us in the more limited way is just one more measure of what Cass Sun-
stein recently pointed out in the pages of my home town law review-
that in the past two decades we have seen a striking shift from private
law to public law thinking about administrative law in general, and about
judicial review in particular.12 Twenty years ago it would have been
clear that the question before us was one about whether the particular
individuals seeking review were entitled to close judicial scrutiny or not.
And, on the whole, those seeking review would not have included the
persons whom the regulatory scheme was intended to protect. The inter-
ests of regulatory beneficiaries would have been thought to lie against
review rather than for it, because review inhibits sturdy and swift govern-
mental attempts to control anti-social behavior by regulation. 13 The ar-
gument for review would have been framed in terms of right, not in
terms of net benefit-review as a means of securing the protection of
individual liberty, not as an element of assuring effective social program
implementation. "The availability of judicial review," Louis Jaffe then
wrote, "is the necessary condition, psychologically if not logically, of a
system of administrative power which purports to be legitimate, or le-
gally valid." 14 Wise as it is, that statement is one whose presupposition is
"as against the citizens on whom the system of administrative power will
12. See Sunstein, Standing and the Privatization of Public Law, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1432, 1432-
33 (1988).
13. A classic statement of the position may be found in Justice Fortas's dissent in Toilet Goods
Ass'n v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 167, 198 (1967) ("The overriding fact here is-or should be-that the
public interest in avoiding the delay in implementing Congress' program far outweighs the private
interest ... ").
14. L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION 320 (1965).
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do its work." It does not ask, as I think we do today, whether judicial
review will help the system do its work better, or what its programmatic
impact is-its capacity to produce behavior by governmental officials in
cases in which review may never be sought (granted that that universe is
a diminishing one, as Don Elliott's statistics seem to be telling us).
Before turning, then, to our narrower topic and asking how it might
be examined, it might be useful to spend a moment or two on those older
values or, perhaps, perspectives. In this respect, Cass' list of possible
ways to define the benefits of review' 5 may remind you of the triad of
values often put forward for evaluating procedural choices. Years ago,
writing of the hearing process, Roger Cramton identified them as accu-
racy, efficiency, and acceptability. 16 The same three factors turn up in a
slightly different fashion in the three models Jerry Mashaw invokes in
Bureaucratic Justice: bureaucratic rationality, professionalism, and
moral judgment.' 7 We want right outcomes, low cost, and satisfied cus-
tomers-and it turns out we cannot maximize all three at once. In both
of those analyses, and in real life I submit to you, they turn out to be
irreconcilable; we can hope for no better than a balance. And so to the
extent one is undertaking a programmatic inquiry about the impact of
close judicial scrutiny, one ought to do so in the context of a caution that
judicial review itself can compromise important values.
I recall here the sense of loss in the move from Goldberg v. Kelly,'8
with its focus (however difficult) on the individual circumstances of the
litigants before that court, to the more general analysis of Mathews v.
Eldridge.19 Judicial review, like hearings, serves a number of functions
that aren't captured by talking about programmatic impact-providing
some assurance of fairness to and recognizing the dignity and worth of
individual participants; encouraging the sense of being heard; controlling
the legality of particular governmental action. And these are matters we
will clearly wish to keep in mind, even if we imagine the general question
before us is being asked from some disembodied public-regarding point
of view. "Are we the people (not particular litigants) better or worse off
with strict judicial scrutiny?" will threaten the interests of particular liti-
gants unless these interests are folded into the equations, and may do so
even then.
15. Sunstein, On the Costs and Benefits of Aggressive Judicial Review of Agency Action, 1989
DUKE L.J. 522-25.
16. Cramton, A Comment on Trial-Type Hearings in Nuclear Power Plant Siting, 58 VA. L.
REv. 585, 592-93 (1972).,
17. J. MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE: MANAGING SOCIAL SECURITY DISABILITY
CLAIMS 25-34 (1983).
18. 397 U.S. 254, 262-66 (1970).
19. 424 U.S. 319, 335-49 (1976).
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Looking at the matter this way points out a number of settings in
which, even if we could not pretend to quantify, we would agree that the
right outcome is for strict scrutiny: where constitutional claims are in
the balance; where important personal interests are at stake-say, in the
context of immigration proceedings; or where the issues are more judicial
than administrative in provenance-say, the meaning of general law.
The cases Cass discusses suggest possible additions to these categories. It
is easy to agree, for example, that the courts should look hard at legal
conclusions suggesting a self-regarding agency expansion of jurisdiction;
one is naturally concerned about the exercise of power. It is harder to
agree, however, that a cost-benefit balance favors close scrutiny of prior-
ity ordering, or retrospective judicial assessments of agency decisions
about what problems to address.
Here, I wonder if one must not distinguish rather sharply between
the Benzene 20 case and the Cotton Dust 2 1 problem, as Cass would see
them. The plurality in Benzene could be regarded as having held only
that the agency must have some priority system; the threshold showing
of significant risk to worker health it found in the statute meant that the
Secretary would have to justify her choice to proceed as well as her re-
sult, but did not suggest that the courts would attempt to assess precisely
what the Secretary's priority ordering ought to have been once she had
determined that that threshold had been passed. The decision about
which risks to go after for the moment and which to leave alone was left
to her.22 The cost-benefit analysis Justice Powell would have required in
Benzene, and that Cass apparently would have preferred in Cotton Dust,
would put the Court in the position of supervising rather more precisely
the cost-benefit assessment or outcome of the particular rulemaking.
This involves it much more deeply in the Secretary's decision of "what to
do." Here especially, it seems to me, is where one gets to a comparative
question. Why would one wish the courts to be involved in the close
supervision of agency priority ordering rather than the political
branches: Congress exercises its supervision through the appropriations
or oversight process, and the President through powerful devices that
have grown up in the same era as hard look review-the impact state-
ment 23 and the regulatory agenda.24
20. Industrial Union Dep't v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607 (1980).
21. American Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 508-09 (1981).
22. Industrial Union Dep't, 448 U.S. at 639-46.
23. Executive Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127, reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 app. at 431-34
(1982).
24. Executive Order No. 12,498, 3 C.F.R. 323 (1986), reprinted in 5 U.S.C.A. § 601 app. at
315-16 (West Supp. 1989).
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We administrative lawyers have not, in fact, tended to think in a
disciplined way about political controls as a form of oversight that may
be superior in some settings to judicial review. Yet a moment's thought
will suggest that, for all its well-known risks, this form of oversight also
offers, in some settings, decided advantages: its operation in real time, as
the agency is acting, rather than years after the event; its openness to
compromise and accommodation; its tie to political accountability; its
possible responsiveness to the polymorphic and contingent character of
many rulemaking disputes.
All this may lead us to an interesting observation about the domain
of the "hard look" issue as it is usually understood. Hard look involves
rulemaking proceedings in which the outcomes may have high social
consequences (people may have to spend a lot of money; businesses may
be undone) but in which participatory values generally and the review
issue in particular have no individualistic focus. These polymorphic dis-
putes, the characteristic domain of the hard look rule, are precisely those
about which Holmes remarked in the Bi-Metallic case that there is no
individual right to be heard, that the citizens' "rights are protected in the
only way that they can be in a complex society, by their [political] power,
immediate or remote, over those who make the rule."'25 The claim for
participation and for an intensity of review are uniquely to serve public
values, and that might suggest more difficulty in reaching the net benefit
outcome. A court is an odd place, as Martin Shapiro recently pointed
out in his Richard B. Russell lectures at Georgia, to be looking for large
scale political controls; its personnel and its procedures are ill suited to
those tasks.26
By way of suggesting a comparison between political and judicial
mechanisms for review, I want to tell you what to me is a cautionary
story about the progenitor of hard look, Citizens to Preserve Overton
Park Inc. v. Volpe.27 We all know that case as the progenitor of hard
look review, because of Justice Marshall's lengthy discussion of what the
role of a court in judicial review ought to be. We tend to lose sight of
what, from the litigant's perspective, was the primary issue presented to
the Court: how the Secretary of Transportation should have interpreted
two parallel federal statutes that required him to assure that park values
were taken into account in funding federal highways. 28 The precise issue
25. Bi-Metallic Inv. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 239 U.S. 441, 445 (1915).
26. See M. SHAPIRO, supra note 9, at 161-64.
27. 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
28. Department of Transportation Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-670 § 4(f), 80 Stat. 931, 934
(codified as amended at 49 U.S.C. § 1653(f) (1982)) (use parkland only if "no feasible and prudent
alternative" and "program includes all possible planning to minimize harm"); Federal Aid-Highway
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was the fate of 26 acres of Overton Park, a beautiful 342-acre park in
downtown Memphis, that were needed to build an interstate highway
through the city. Most of the road was already in place, but the park
segment remained unfinished awaiting final approval from federal au-
thorities.29 It appears that, taking provisions in this statute and others
referring to local hearings of a political character as his cue, the Secre-
tary had gone to the City Council of Memphis and told them to make
their decision without taking cost into account as a factor.30 Since the
Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-495, 82 Stat. 815, 823-24 (1968) (codified as amended at 23 U.S.C. § 138
(1982)) (same).
29. The issue had been on the table since 1955, and the route through the park first won (provi-
sional) federal approval from the Bureau of Roads in 1956-at that point, it is fair to say, on a basis
that called attention to the lower cost and reduced dislocations that would result from building
through the park rather than around its well-settled perimeter. Like Westway more recently in New
York City, and other inner-city expressways, the route remained a hotly debated local issue for more
than a decade after. The enactment of amendments to the relevant federal statutes in 1968 intro-
duced constraints on the use of parkland, and required reconsideration. Compare Federal-Aid High-
way Act of 1966 Pub. L. No. 89 574, 80 Stat. 766, 771 (1966) with Pub. L. No. 90-495, 82 Stat. at
823-24.
30. This account draws on Federal Highway Administrator Bridwell's testimony to a Senate
Hearing before the Subcommittee on Roads, May 18, 1968, relied on by the Sixth Circuit in the
opinion later reversed by the Supreme Court:
We went to the city council of Memphis and we said, "Yes, there are alternatives. We
won't even give you any information on what the alternatives cost in dollars because we
don't want that to be a factor in your recommendation of which line to choose. Rather, we
would like you to focus upon the conflicting set of community values that are inherent in
this kind of a situation."
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 432 F.2d 1307, 1313 (6th Cir. 1970) rev'd, 401 U.S.
402 (1971). In addition to section 4(f)'s reference to local determination of the possible significance
of parkland for the purposes of that section, 49 U.S.C. § 1653(f), another provision generally bearing
on issues of road location explicitly required a state hearing process in localities to be affected by
proposed projects. 23 U.S.C. § 128 (1982). Its evident purpose, elaborated in applicable federal
regulations, was to ensure a local forum for the resolution of development issues that would be
educated about and responsive to environmental as well as developmental concerns. See generally
GRAY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 913-914 (1970). Much of the litigation
prior to the Court's decision had been concerned with whether this hearing met that requirement.
An author making the transition from oral discussion gadfly to writer-for-the-ages is obliged to
admit that the full tale of Overton Park is a good bit more complex than his oral remarks may
suggest. There were those who believed-and with some support in the record-that Highway Ad-
ministrator Bridwell's account was self-serving if not deceitful. There appear to have been conve-
nient gaps in the hearing records over the years, that mysteriously coincided with opponents'
presentations. See Death Row, AUDUBON, Jan. 1970, 120, 121; but see Overton Park 432 F.2d at
1313 ("In our opinion, the testimony of Mr. Bridwell is further evidence that the Secretary complied
with the statute"). After the February 14, 1968 public meeting, the City Council had approved a
resolution stating that it "prefers that the Expressway ... be not routed in its present proposed
location but ... another," indicating one which it would approve "if no better route can be ob-
tained." Appendix to Briefs at 23 Overton Park, 401 U.S. 402 (1971) (No. 1066). In April, Admin-
istrator Bridwell met again with the City Council-this time in private-and it changed its tune,
adopting a resolution finding the park route to be the "feasible and prudent location." Id. at 26. Cf
Death Row, supra, at 121 ("Bridwell proceeded to ram 1-40 down the City Council's throats") with 3
PARKS & RECREATION 62 (Sept. 1968) (Bridwell merely "urged the councilmen to decide what they
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federal government was to provide 90% of the cost of the roadway wher-
ever it was located, he said, they should disregard that factor and take
special account of parkland values. This armed the already active, local
political process. This issue was before the City Council for weeks, was
spread across the pages of the Memphis newspapers, and eventually re-
sulted in a settlement. The State of Tennessee paid what amounted to
condemnation money to the City of Memphis for the 26 acres of Overton
Park, and-pursuant to an ordinance enacted in this connection-the
City of Memphis used the money to buy several hundred acres of re-
placement parkland, one indication that it had indeed taken special care
to preserve parkland values. The Secretary released the 90% federal
funding.
Since the Secretary wrote no opinion, only his course of conduct
suggests that he had interpreted the statute's language about assuring the
protection of parkland values as embracing this political approach. Yet
this was an available interpretation of the statute, and the Court ac-
knowledges in its opinion that "[t]he legislative history.., is ambigu-
ous."'31 It rejected that approach to the statute, however, in favor of one
in which the courts were to take a hard look to assure that parkland
values had been protected. A legal process, a judicial process, was used
rather than a political process because in the Court's judgment any other
approach would risk that parkland values would be submerged rather
than be assigned the "paramount importance" 32 it had concluded the
statute required.
Similar developments were occurring at the same time in the context
of environmental control. The National Environmental Policy Act easily
could have been understood as a statute intended to arm a bureaucratic
device for political enforcement. 33 It was not so understood, and became
wanted to do about the expressway," indicating that with the Council's support, he could "defend
the Overton Park route in court.").
This is not the forum to tell the whole story, more complex than hinted at here; that is a project
long on my to-do list. The problem in knowing just what happened in Memphis points out a diffi.
culty in relying on political controls, undoubtedly present. Yet the Administrator's course in dealing
with the Memphis City Council and exposing it to political heat, whatever its decision, was clearly
within the possibilities opened by the language of sections 4(f) and 138, "an ambiguous compromise
between highway advocates and environmentalists." R. STEWART & J. KRIER, ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW AND POLICY 679 (2d ed. 1978); see Overton ParA, 401 U.S. at 412 n.29 ("The legislative history
... is ambiguous."); Note, The Supreme Court, 1970 Term, 85 HARV. L. REV. 324-25 (1971). And
such disagreements are often worked out in the political marketplace; the question remains one of
balancing the relative advantages and risks of alternative approaches.
31. Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 412 n.29.
32. Id. at 412-13.
33. The Supreme Court's interpretation of NEPA this spring in Robertson v. Methow Valley
Citizens Council, 109 S. Ct. 1835, 1847 (1989), announced after these remarks were delivered, sug-
gests a more political understanding of the statute. The Court in that case refused to understand
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the occasion for widespread judicial enforcement.
Particularly in the context of the fiscal challenge that we all face,
wishing to regulate to some extent and knowing that we have not got
very much money for those who are going to do it, we need to be recon-
sidering the wisdom of these choices. Finding a purpose to enforce polit-
ical controls in the statutes underlying Overton Park would have
effectively transferred the responsibility for decision from bureaucrats in
Washington to a politically responsible municipal council in Memphis,
Tennessee, while making clear that parkland values were central. The
council members were going to pay with their next terms if they made
the wrong choice in terms of the local values of the people of Memphis.
While the political process hardly assured perfection-risking, for exam-
ple, preference for racially discrete small parks over a city-wide mag-
net-it evidently fostered the values of negotiation and compromise.
Judicial enforcement, by contrast, was bipolar, produced without re-
gard for the values of politics. Whatever else was the case for Citizens to
Preserve Overton Park, Inc., the chief cost confronting the plaintiff in
deciding to sue-however public spirited its members may have been by
their own lights-was the price of their own lawyers. It was, as was
earlier remarked, rather cheap for them to sue. The monkey wrench was
available. 34 One might be reassured if one knew that the monkey wrench
would always be exercised by public-spirited groups like Citizens to Pre-
serve Overton Park, Inc. but it appears that the largest portion of law-
NEPA as commanding action as well as analysis; the fact of the analysis might arm a political
response, or change the environment in which it would occur, but the courts had no role to play in
enforcing agency responses to NEPA analyses, once they had been appropriately made.
34. Again, the desirable simplicity of oral remarks conceals a more complex reality. Two issues
were presented in the case-whether the park route could be used at all; and, if it was to be used,
whether all appropriate steps had been taken to secure parkland values to the maximum feasible
degree. The Department had decided the first question as early as 1956, and in any event no later
than the period following Administrator Bridwell's trips to Memphis in the spring of 1968; the
second was not decided until the fall of the following year.
Give and take on design decisions (Shall the roadway be on the surface? In a cut depressed
beneath it? In a tunnel under the park, with appropriate ventilation devices?) is perhaps more read-
ily imagined, even for a party such as Citizens to Preserve Overton Park. Here, too, one can argue
that the presence of an anchor to windward--citizens' groups who will sue if the Secretary is too
forthcoming in her dealings with developers-will stiffen the Secretary's resolve and thus produce
better outcomes in a process of compromise and accommodation. In the lower courts, the litigation
appears to have been as much concerned with the adequacy of the Secretary's design determinations
as with the legality of having the road'in the park at all. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc.,
v. Volpe, 309 F. Supp. 1189, 1195 (D. Tenn.), aff'd, 432 F.2d 1307 (6th Cir. 1970), rev'd, 401 U.S.
402 (1971); Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 335 F. Supp. 873, 883-85 (D. Tenn
1972). Indeed, clearing of the projected roadway up to the very border of the park was well under
way by 1969, Overton Park, 432 F.2d at 1312-13, and the absence of litigation to stop it suggests an
understanding that the true stakes lay in how, not whether, the roadway would be built. In this
respect, the Court's focus on the first question may have come as something of a shock.
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suits challenging agency action brought in the D.C. Circuit (and I
imagine elsewhere) is brought by corporations and not the others. So
this is, I believe, a cautionary tale.
One political alternative to hard look, against which comparative
assessments perhaps need to be freshly made, lies in the oversight of
agency rulemaking by OMB's Office of Information and Regulatory
Analysis (OIRA) under Executive Order Nos. 12498 and 12291. 35 To
what extent is the work that we might have thought was being done by
hard look review now being done by the President's staffi-however im-
perfectly, however politically-in that setting where we have long
thought, as Holmes said, that the citizens' rights are primarily to be pro-
tected by their political power over those who make the rules and not by
other processes. 36
It would not be hard to describe the OIRA process as a Presidential
substitute for hard look review. Whatever else this process does-and
one understands that for some it is arm-twisting, for others necessary
coordination 37-it forces attention to facts and policy choices just as
hard look review may.
While the presidential review mechanisms present political hazards
hard look review may not, they also have decided advantages. The Presi-
dent's staff is in a better position than a court to get (and has the incen-
tive to get) the "big picture"-to understand how this enterprise fits with
others, to formulate and even enforce a sense of priority in governmental
action. Judicial review is necessarily atomistic, irresponsible, uninformed
by such concerns and perspectives. Moreover, if increasingly we have to
worry about the cost of regulating as well as the cost of regulation-if,
that is, agencies will have to stretch their regulatory dollars in a budget-
deficit-conscious environment-presidential controls are more likely
than judicial ones to accommodate those realities. Their resource de-
mands can be modified more flexibly as they become apparent, or as it
appears desired patterns of analysis have been adopted by the agencies
themselves. Focused management, in general, seems more likely than
dispersed management to produce cost-effective pursuit of the public in-
terest, within whatever budgetary constraints are imposed. Once we
have taken the public rather than the private law posture toward the
35. Executive Order No. 12,498, 3 C.F.R. 323 (1986), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 app. at 315-
16 (West Supp. 1989); Executive Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127, reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601 app. at
431-34 (1982).
36. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
37. The recent literature is collected in Bruff, Presidential Management ofAgency Rulemaking,
57 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 533 (1989); see also National Acad. of Pub. Admin., Presidential Manage-
ment of Rulemaking in Regulatory Agencies (1987).
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possible value of review, valuing systematic more than individual justice
issues, the question may be gaining some sense of an ideal balance in
regulation. If we have tradeoffs between quality and quantity, we will
need to learn how to value one as against the other. Close scrutiny judi-
cial review, concerned with just this proceeding, cannot readily ask such
questions.
In the best of worlds-that is, in a world where one could rely on
the courts for an apolitical objectivity in sharp contrast to the contribu-
tions of President and Congress-one would still have had the difficult
task of evaluating the shadow effects as well as the direct effects of close
scrutiny, of evaluating its impact on administrative proceedings without
regard to whether they are actually reviewed in court. Here we return to
the argument between Bill Pedersen, 38 say, and Shep Melnick 39 about
whether that impact is helpful, or random and perhaps paralyzing. Re-
cent scholarship is tending to the latter assessment; in addition to the
studies already mentioned, you will want to see John Mendeloff's Di-
lemma of Toxic Substance Regulation, 40 a study of the relation between
over-regulation and under-regulation at OSHA, and the forthcoming
study by Jerry Mashaw and David Harfst, The Freedom Machine.4 1
Mashaw and Harfst show, in the particular context of the National Traf-
fic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act, how hard look review appears to have
contributed to a paralysis of the rulemaking process. The resulting prac-
tice of defensive law, in the context of rulemaking, produces outputs of
such intricacy and detail as to swallow the possibility of significant ac-
tion; hence, their stunning finding that NHTSA hasn't begun work on a
major new rule since the administration of Gerald Ford.
One needs to acknowledge that rulemaking paralysis is hardly only
the courts' fault. Indecision in Congress and changing administrations
has had a lot to do with it. Yet there is truth also in two perspectives the
Supreme Court was able to gain in the Vermont Yankee case: first, that
review expectations can lead to a defensive practice of law that disserves
the agency's general program;42 second, that for complex proceedings,
close scrutiny inevitably focuses on only one or a few of many issues, and
thus distorts agency process-it may demand a level of perfection in
practice that no one could justify in theory. 43 When the Department of
Transportation's initial air-bag rule-the result of extended proceedings
38. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
39. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
40. J. MENDELOFF, THE DILEMMA OF Toxic SUBSTANCE REGULATION: How OVERREGU-
LATION CAUSES UNDERREGULATION AT OSHA 115-22 (1988)
41. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
42. Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. NRDC, 435 U.S. 519, 547 (1978).
43. Id. at 553-54, 558.
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and embodying countless complex judgments-could be stymied for fail-
ure to develop a sufficiently stiff-necked testing dummy,44 the agency
learned a hard lesson about the exactitude to which it might be held.
The risks of this sort of hard look are magnified by the realization of
how limited are the realistic possibilities for the Supreme Court's disci-
pline of the federal judicial system. An article I published in the fall of
198745 suggested that a federal court of appeals judge would not expect
her opinions to be reviewed by the Court more than two or three times a
decade-hardly a significant prospect for control. The result is to make
it much harder to rely on the judicial outcome as involving any necessary
precision or coherence. The President may reasonably claim that bal-
ance and cohesion will more likely result from his processes.
All this may suggest that in writing about judicial review from the
public rights perspective, too, the relevant question is "close scrutiny of
what?" And one must ask too, for what ends-that is, with what image
of the administrative system and its ends in view. I find it hard to disa-
gree with the conclusion of Martin Shapiro's Russell lectures. Coming to
grips with a world of statutes that do not in fact have fixed meanings, of
complex technological problems that do not have demonstrably correct
answers, means that we can expect little more from agencies than careful
deliberation and prudence-and the role of the courts in this political
context should be no more ambitious than to encourage those qualities.
If one could capture in a formula the level and object of judicial scrutiny
that would arm the forces of reason within the agencies without encour-
aging defensive excess, that would be our goal. It is, as it always has
been, a matter of the judges being aware of their own limits at the same
time as they set limits for others. Shapiro's closing words seem apt
enough for me:
[W]e know that judges are really no more prudent than the rest of
us. So long as we let the judges know that we know that, they are
unlikely to get overambitious about substituting their prudence for
that of others more directly subject to democratic control.46
44. Chrysler Corp. v. Department of Transp., 472 F.2d 659 (6th Cir. 1972); see also Love v.
Thomas, 858 F.2d 1347 (9th Cir. 1988).
45. Strauss, One Hundred Fifty Casesper Year: Some Implications of the Supreme Court's Lim-
ited Resources for Judicial Review of Agency Action, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 1093, 1098-99 (1987).
46. M. SHAPIRO, supra note 9, at 173.
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